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ABSTRACT
A game-theoretic model is proposed to study the cross-layer
problem of joint power and rate control with quality of ser-
vice (QoS) constraints in multiple-access networks. In the
proposed game, each user seeks to choose its transmit power
and rate in a distributed manner in order to maximize its
own utility and at the same time satisfy its QoS require-
ments. The user’s QoS constraints are specified in terms
of the average source rate and average delay. The utility
function considered here measures energy efficiency and the
delay includes both transmission and queueing delays. The
Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed non-cooperative
game is derived and a closed-form expression for the utility
achieved at equilibrium is obtained. It is shown that the
QoS requirements of a user translate into a “size” for the
user which is an indication of the amount of network re-
sources consumed by the user. Using this framework, the
tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and
energy efficiency are also studied.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design—wireless communication, distributed
networks
General Terms
Theory, performance
Keywords
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sign, game theory, Nash equilibrium, power and rate control
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1. INTRODUCTION
Future wireless networks are expected to support a va-
riety of services with diverse quality of service (QoS) re-
quirements. Because of the hostile characteristics of wireless
channels and scarcity of radio resources such as energy and
bandwidth, efficient resource allocation schemes are neces-
sary for design of high-performance wireless networks. The
objective is to use the radio resources as efficiently as pos-
sible and at the same time satisfy the QoS requirements of
the users which can be expressed in terms of constraints on
rate, delay or fidelity.
Since in most practical scenarios, the users’ terminals are
battery-powered, energy efficient resource allocation is cru-
cial to prolonging the battery life of the terminals. In this
work, we study the cross-layer problem of QoS-constrained
joint power and rate control in wireless networks using a
game-theoretic framework. We consider a multiple-access
network and propose a non-cooperative game in which each
user seeks to choose its transmit power and rate in such a
way as to maximize its energy-efficiency (measured in bits
per joule) and at the same time satisfy its QoS require-
ments. The QoS constraints are in terms of the average
source rate and average total delay (transmission plus queue-
ing delay). We derive the Nash equilibrium solution for the
proposed game and use this framework to study tradeoffs
among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy effi-
ciency. Network capacity here refers to the maximum num-
ber of users that can be accommodated by the network.
Joint power and rate control with QoS constraints have
been studied extensively for multiple-access networks (see
for example [1] and [2]). In [1], the authors study joint power
and rate control under bit-error rate (BER) and average de-
lay constraints. [2] considers the problem of globally opti-
mizing the transmit power and rate to maximize throughput
of non-real-time users and protect the QoS of real-time users.
Neither work takes into account energy-efficiency. Recently
tradeoffs between energy efficiency and delay have gained
more attention. The tradeoffs in the single-user case are
studied in [3]–[6]. The multiuser problem in turn is con-
sidered in [7] and [8]. In [7], the authors present a cen-
tralized scheduling scheme to transmit the arriving packets
within a specific time interval such that the total energy con-
sumed is minimized whereas in [8], a distributed ALOHA-
type scheme is proposed for achieving energy-delay trade-
offs. Joint power and rate control for maximizing goodput
in delay-constrained networks is studied in [9].
This work is the first study of QoS-constrained power
and rate control in multiple-access networks using a game-
theoretic framework. In our proposed game-theoretic model,
users choose their transmit powers and rates in a competitive
and distributed manner in order to maximize their energy ef-
ficiency and at the same time satisfy their QoS requirements.
Using this framework, we also analyze the tradeoffs among
throughput, delay, network capacity and energy efficiency.
Even though a centralized approach is possible due to pres-
ence of an access point (AP), a distributed mechanism is
more attractive due to its scalability and low complexity. It
should be noted that game-theoretic approaches to power
control have previously been studied in various work (see
for example [10]–[17]). However, [10]–[16] do not take into
account the effect of delay, and [17] only considers transmis-
sion delay and does not perform any rate control.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the system model. The proposed
joint power and rate control game is discussed in Section 3
and its Nash equilibrium solution is derived in Section 4.
We then describe an admission control scheme in Section 5.
Tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and
energy efficiency are studied in Section 6 using numerical
results. Finally, we give conclusions in Section 7.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a direct-sequence code-division multiple-access
(DS-CDMA) network and propose a non-cooperative (dis-
tributed) game in which each user seeks to choose its trans-
mit power and rate to maximize its energy efficiency (mea-
sured in bits per joule) while satisfying its QoS requirements.
We specify the QoS constraints of user k by (rk, Dk) where
rk is the average source rate and Dk is the upper bound on
average delay. The delay includes both queueing and trans-
mission delays. The incoming traffic is assumed to have a
Poisson distribution with parameter λk which represents the
average packet arrival rate with each packet consisting of M
bits. The source rate (in bit per second) is hence given by
rk =Mλk .
The user transmits the arriving packets at a rate Rk (bps)
and with a transmit power equal to pk Watts. We consider
an automatic-repeat-request (ARQ)mechanism in which the
user keeps retransmitting a packet until the packet is re-
ceived at the access point without any errors. The incoming
packets are assumed to be stored in a queue and transmitted
in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) fashion. The packet transmis-
sion time for user k is defined as
τk =
M
Rk
+ ǫk ≃
M
Rk
, (1)
where ǫk represents the time taken for the user to receive
an ACK/NACK from the access point. We assume ǫk is
negligible compared to M
Rk
. The packet success probabil-
ity (per transmission) is represented by f(γk) where γk is
the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) for
user k. The retransmissions are assumed to be independent.
The packet success rate, f(γ), is assumed to be increasing
and S-shaped (sigmoidal) with f(0) = 0 and f(∞) = 1.
This is a valid assumption for many practical scenarios as
long as the packet size is reasonably large (e.g., M = 100
bits).
We can represent the combination of user k’s queue and
wireless link as an M/G/1 queue, as shown in Figure 1,
Figure 1: System model based on an M/G/1 queue.
where the traffic is Poisson with parameter λk (in packets
per second) and the service time, Sk, has the following prob-
ability mass function (PMF):
Pr{Sk = mτk} = f(γk) (1− f(γk))
m−1 for m = 1, 2, · · ·
(2)
As a result, the service rate, µk, is given by
µk =
1
E{Sk}
=
f(γk)
τk
, (3)
and the load factor ρk =
λk
µk
= λkτk
f(γk)
.
To keep the queue of user k stable, we must have ρk <
1 or f(γk) > λkτk. Now, let Wk be a random variable
representing the total packet delay for user k. This delay
includes the time the packet spends in the queue as well as
the service time. It is known that for an M/G/1 queue the
average wait time (including the queueing and service time)
is given by
W¯k =
L¯k
λk
, (4)
where L¯k = ρk +
ρ2k+λ
2
kσ
2
Sk
2(1−ρk)
with σ2Sk being the variance of
the service time [18]. Therefore, the average packet delay
for user k is given by
W¯k = τk
(
1− λkτk
2
f(γk)− λkτk
)
with f(γk) > λkτk. (5)
We require the average delay for user k’s packets to be less
than or equal to Dk. This translates to
W¯k ≤ Dk (6)
or
f(γk) ≥ λkτk +
τk
Dk
−
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
. (7)
However, since 0 ≤ f(γk) < 1, (7) is possible only if
1
0 ≤ λkτk +
τk
Dk
−
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
< 1. (8)
This means that λk and Dk are feasible only if they sat-
isfy (8). Note that the upper bound on the average delay
1Note that f(γ) = 1 requires an infinite SIR which is not
practical.
(i.e., Dk) cannot be smaller than transmission time τk. This
automatically implies that λkτk +
τk
Dk
−
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
> 0.
Let us define ηk = λkτk +
τk
Dk
−
λkτ
2
k
2Dk
. Then, (7) is equiv-
alent to the condition γ ≥ γˆk where
γˆk = f
−1(ηk) (9)
with ηk < 1 and Rk ≥ M/Dk. This means that the delay
constraint in (6) translates into a lower bound on the output
SIR. It should be noted that the delay QoS constraint con-
sidered here is in terms of average delay. An average-delay
constraint may not be sufficient for applications with hard
delay requirements (see [19] for a more detailed discussion
on the delay distribution).
3. THE JOINT POWER AND RATE CON-
TROL GAME
Consider the non-cooperative joint power and rate control
game (PRCG) G = [K, {Ak}, {uk}] where K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}
is the set of users, Ak = [0, Pmax] × [0, B] is the strategy
set for user k with a strategy corresponding to a choice of
transmit power and transmit rate, and uk is the utility func-
tion for user k. Here, Pmax and B are the maximum trans-
mit power and the system bandwidth, respectively. For the
sake of simplicity, throughout this paper, we assume Pmax
is large. Each user chooses its transmit power and rate in
order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its QoS
requirements. The utility function for a user is defined as
the ratio of the user’s goodput to its transmit power, i.e.,
uk =
Tk
pk
, (10)
where the goodput Tk is the number of bits that are trans-
mitted successfully per second and is given by
Tk = Rkf(γk). (11)
Therefore, the utility function for user k is given by
uk = Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (12)
This utility function has units of bits per joule and is partic-
ularly suitable for wireless networks where energy efficiency
is important.
Fixing other users’ transmit powers and rates, the utility-
maximizing strategy for user k is given by the solution of
the following constrained maximization:
max
pk,Rk
uk s.t. W¯k ≤ Dk , (13)
or equivalently
max
pk,Rk
uk s.t. γk > γˆk and 0 ≤ ηk < 1 (14)
where γˆk = f
−1(ηk) and
ηk =
Mλk
Rk
+
M
DkRk
−
M2λk
2DkR2k
. (15)
Note that for a matched filter receiver and with random
spreading sequences, the received SIR is approximately given
by
γk =
(
B
Rk
)
pkhk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k pjhj
, (16)
where hk is the channel gain for user k and σ
2 is the noise
power in the bandwidth B.
Let us first look at the maximization in (14) without any
constraints, i.e.,
max
pk,Rk
uk ≡ max
pk,Rk
Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (17)
Theorem 1. The unconstrained utility maximization in
(17) has an infinite number of solutions. More specifically,
any combination of pk and Rk that achieves an output SIR
equal to γ∗, the solution to f(γ) = γf ′(γ), maximizes uk.
Proof. Let p˜k and R˜k be any power-rate combination
such that (
B
R˜k
)
p˜khk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k pjhj
= γ˜.
Then, we have
u˜k = R˜k
f(γ˜)
p˜k
=
Bhˆk
γ˜
f(γ˜), (18)
where
hˆk =
hk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k pjhj
. (19)
This means that when other users’ powers and rates are fixed
(i.e., fixed hˆk), user k’s utility depends only on γ˜ and is in-
dependent of the specific values of pk and Rk. In addition,
by taking the derivative of f(γ)
γ
with respect to γ and equat-
ing it to zero, it can be shown that f(γ)
γ
is maximized when
γ = γ∗, the (unique) positive solution of f(γ) = γf ′(γ).
Therefore, uk is maximized for any combination of pk andRk
for which γk = γ
∗. This means that there are infinitely many
solutions for the unconstrained maximization in (17).
The second constraint in (14) can equivalently be ex-
pressed as
Rk >
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k
2
. (20)
Therefore, the maximization in (14) is equivalent to
max
pk,Rk
Rk
f(γk)
pk
s.t. γk > γˆk
and Rk >
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k
2
. (21)
Let us define
Ω∞k =
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k
2
.
Note that for Rk = Ω
∞
k , we have ηk = 1 and hence γˆk =∞.
Also, define Ω∗k as the rate for which γˆk = γ
∗, i.e.,
Ω∗k =
(
M
Dk
)
1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k + 2(1− f
∗)Dkλk
2f∗
(22)
where f∗ = f(γ∗). It is easy to show that γˆk > γ
∗ for
all Ω∞k < Rk < Ω
∗
k. This means that based on (18), user
k has no incentive to transmit at a rate smaller than Ω∗k.
Furthermore, based on Theorem 1, any combination of pk
and Rk ≥ Ω
∗
k that results in an output SIR equal to γ
∗ is a
solution to the constrained maximization in (14). Note that
when Rk = Ω
∗
k and γk = γ
∗, we have W¯k = Dk.
4. NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE PRCG
For a non-cooperative game, a Nash equilibrium is de-
fined as a set of strategies for which no user can unilaterally
improve its own utility [20]. We saw in Section 3 that for
our proposed non-cooperative game, each user has infinitely
many strategies that maximize the user’s utility. In partic-
ular, any combination of pk and Rk for which γk = γ
∗ and
Rk ≥ Ω
∗
k is a best-response strategy.
Theorem 2. If
∑K
k=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
k
γ∗
< 1, then the PRCG has
at least one Nash equilibrium given by (p∗k,Ω
∗
k), for k =
1, · · · ,K, where p∗k =
σ2
hk

 11+ BΩ∗kγ∗
1−
∑
K
j=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
j
γ∗

 and Ω∗k is given
by (22). Furthermore, when there are more than one Nash
equilibrium, (p∗k,Ω
∗
k) is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Proof. If
∑K
j=1
1
1+ B
Ω∗
j
γ∗
< 1 then p∗k is positive and fi-
nite. Now, if we let pk = p
∗
k and Rk = Ω
∗
k, then the output
SIR for all the users will be equal to γ∗ which means every
user is using its best-response strategy. Therefore, (p∗k,Ω
∗
k)
for k = 1, · · · ,K is a Nash equilibrium.
More generally, if we let Rk = R˜k ≥ Ω
∗
k and provided
that
∑K
j=1
1
1+ B
R˜jγ
∗
< 1, then (p˜k, R˜k) is a Nash equilibrium
where p˜k =
σ2
hk

 11+ BR˜kγ∗
1−
∑
K
j=1
1
1+ B
R˜jγ
∗

. Hence, based on (12),
at Nash equilibrium, the utility of user k is given by
uk =
Bf(γ∗)hk
σ2γ∗

1−
∑
j 6=k
1
1+ B
R˜jγ
∗
1− 1
1+ B
R˜kγ
∗

 . (23)
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium with the smallest R˜k achieves
the largest utility. A higher transmission rate for a user re-
quires a larger transmit power by that user to achieve γ∗.
This not only reduces the user’s utility but also causes more
interference for other users in the network and forces them
to raise their transmit powers as well which will result in
a reduction in their utilities. This means that the Nash
equilibrium with Rk = Ω
∗
k and p
∗
k for k = 1, · · · , K is the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Based on the feasibility condition given by Theorem 2, let
us define the “size” of user k as
Φ∗k =
1
1 + B
Ω∗
k
γ∗
. (24)
Therefore, the feasibility condition of Theorem 2 can be
written as
K∑
k=1
Φ∗k < 1. (25)
Note that the QoS requirements of user k (i.e., its source rate
rk and delay constraint Dk) uniquely determine Ω
∗
k through
(22) and, in turn, determine the size of the user (i.e., Φ∗k)
through (24). The size of a user is basically an indication
of the amount of network resources consumed by that user.
A larger source rate or a tighter delay constraint for a user
increases the size of the user. The network can accommo-
date a set of users if and only if their total size is less than
1. In Section 6, we use this framework to study the trade-
offs among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy
efficiency.
5. ADMISSION CONTROL
In Section 4, we defined the “size” of a user based on its
QoS requirements. Before joining the network, each user
calculates its size using (24) and announces it to the ac-
cess point. According to (25), the access point admits those
users whose total size is less than 1. While the goal of each
user is to maximize its own energy efficiency, a more sophis-
ticated admission control can be performed to maximize the
total network utility. In other words, out of the K users,
the access point can choose those users for which the total
network utility is the largest, i.e.,
max
L⊂{1,··· ,K}
∑
ℓ∈L
uℓ (26)
under the constraint that
∑
ℓ∈LΦ
∗
ℓ < 1.
Based on (23), the utility of user ℓ at the Pareto-dominant
Nash equilibrium is given by
uℓ =
(
Bhℓf(γ
∗)
σ2γ∗
)
1−
∑
i∈LΦ
∗
i
1− Φ∗ℓ
. (27)
As a result, (26) becomes
max
L⊂{1,··· ,K}
(
1−
∑
i∈L
Φ∗i
)∑
ℓ∈L
hℓ
1−Φ∗ℓ
(28)
under the constraint that
∑
ℓ∈LΦ
∗
ℓ < 1.
In general, obtaining a closed-form solution for (28) is
difficult since it depends on the channel gains and sizes of
the users. Instead, in order to gain some insight, let us
consider the special case in which all users are at the same
distance from the access point. We first consider the scenario
in which the users have identical QoS requirements (i.e.,
Φ∗1 = · · · = Φ
∗
K = Φ
∗). If we replace
∑L
ℓ=1 hℓ by LE{h},
then (28) becomes
max
L
E{h}(L− L2Φ∗)
1− Φ∗
. (29)
Therefore, the optimal number of users for maximizing the
total utility in the network is L =
[
1
2Φ∗
]
where [x] represents
the integer nearest to x.
Now consider another scenario in which there are C classes
of users. The users in class c are assumed to all have the
same QoS requirements and hence the same size, Φ∗(c). Since
we are assuming that all the users are at the same distance
from the access point, they all have the same average chan-
nel gain. Now, if the access point admits L(c) users from
class c then the total utility is given by
uT =
(
BE{h}f(γ∗)
σ2γ∗
)(
1−
C∑
c=1
L(c)Φ∗(c)
)(
C∑
c=1
L(c)
1−Φ∗(c)
)
provided that
∑C
c=1 L
(c)Φ∗(c) < 1. Without loss of general-
ity, let us assume that Φ∗(1) < Φ∗(2) < · · · < Φ∗(C). It can
be shown that uT is maximized when L
(1) =
[
1
2Φ∗(1)
]
with
L(c) = 0 for c = 2, 3, · · · , C. This is because adding a user
from class 1 is always more beneficial in terms of increasing
the total utility than adding a user from any other class.
Therefore, in order to maximize the total utility in the net-
work, the access point must admit only users from the class
with the smallest size. While this solution maximizes the
total network utility, it is not fair. A more sophisticated
admission control mechanism can be used to improve the
fairness. In the next section, we demonstrate the loss in
network energy efficiency if a suboptimal admission control
strategy is used.
6. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Let us consider the uplink of a DS-CDMA system with
a total bandwidth of 5MHz (i.e., B = 5MHz). Each user
in the network has a set of QoS requirements expressed as
(rk, Dk) where rk is the source rate and Dk is the delay
requirement (upper bound on the average total delay) for
user k. As explained in Section 4, the QoS parameters of a
user define a “size” for that user, denoted by Φ∗k given by
(24). Before a user starts transmitting, it must announce its
size to the access point. Based on the particular admission
policy, the access point decides whether or not to admit the
user. For the cases where there are multiple equilibria, we
assume that the admitted users agree to choose the transmit
powers and rates that correspond to the Pareto-dominant
Nash equilibrium. This is an important assumption that
requires its own study.
Figure 2 shows the user’s utility as a function of delay
for different source rates. The total size of the other users
in the network is assumed to be 0.2. The user’s utility is
normalized by Bh/σ2, and the delay is normalized by the
inverse of the system bandwidth. As expected, a tighter
delay requirement and/or a higher source rate results in a
lower utility for the user.
Figure 3 shows the user size, network capacity, transmis-
sion rate, and total goodput as a function of normalized
delay for different source rates. The network capacity refers
to the maximum number of users that can be admitted into
the network assuming that all the users have the same QoS
requirements (i.e., the same size). The transmission rate
and goodput are normalized by the system bandwidth. The
total goodput is obtained by multiplying the source rate by
the total number of users. As the QoS requirements become
more stringent (i.e., a higher source rate and/or a smaller
delay), the size of the user increases which means more net-
work resources are required to accommodate the user. This
results in a reduction in the network capacity. It is also
observed from the figure that when the delay constraint is
loose, the total goodput is almost independent of the source
rate. This is because a lower source rate is compensated by
the fact that more users can be admitted into the network.
On the other hand, when the delay constraint in tight, the
total goodput is higher for larger source rates.
Now to study admission control, let us consider a network
with three different classes of users/sources:
1. Class A users for which r(A) = 5kbps and D(A) =
10ms, and hence, Φ∗
(A)
= 0.0198.
2. Class B users for which r(B) = 50kbps and D(B) =
50ms, and hence, Φ∗
(B)
= 0.0718.
3. Class C users for which r(C) = 150kbps and D(C) =
1000ms, and hence, Φ∗
(B)
= 0.1848.
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Table 1: Percentage loss in the total network utility
for different choices of L(A), L(B) and L(C).
L(A) L(B) L(C) Loss in total utility
25 0 0 –
23 1 0 10%
20 0 1 30%
18 1 1 38%
0 7 0 71%
0 0 3 87%
For the purpose of illustration, let us assume that there are
a large number of users in each class and that they all are
at the same distance from the access point (i.e., they all
have the same average channel gain). The access point re-
ceives requests from the users and has to decide which ones
to admit in order to maximize the total utility in the net-
work (see (28)). We know from Section 5 that since users
in class A have the smallest size, the total utility is maxi-
mized if the access point picks users from class A only with
L(A) =
[
1/2Φ∗
(A)
]
= 25. However, this solution does not
take into account fairness issues. Instead, we may be more
interested in solutions in which more than one class of users
are admitted. Table 1 shows the percentage loss in the total
utility for several choices of L(A), L(B) and L(C).
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the cross-layer problem of joint power
and rate control with QoS constraints in wireless networks
using a game-theoretic framework. We have proposed a
non-cooperative game in which users seek to choose their
transmit powers and rates in such a way as to maximize
their utilities and at the same time satisfy their QoS re-
quirements. The utility function considered here measures
the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy
consumed. The QoS requirements for a user consist of the
average source rate and the average delay where the delay
includes both transmission and queueing delays. We have
derived the Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed game
and obtained a closed-form solution for the user’s utility
at equilibrium. Using this framework, we have studied the
tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and
energy efficiency, and have shown that presence of users with
stringent QoS requirements results in significant reductions
in network capacity and energy efficiency.
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